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Two-­‐alternative	  forced-­‐choice	  recognition	  tests	  are	  commonly	  used	  to	  assess	  recognition	  
accuracy	  that	  is	  uncontaminated	  by	  changes	  in	  bias.	  In	  such	  tests,	  participants	  are	  asked	  to	  endorse	  
the	  studied	  item	  out	  of	  two	  presented	  alternatives.	  Participants	  may	  be	  further	  asked	  to	  provide	  
confidence	  judgments	  for	  their	  recognition	  decisions.	  It	  is	  often	  assumed	  that	  both	  recognition	  
decisions	  and	  confidence	  judgments	  in	  two-­‐alternative	  forced-­‐choice	  recognition	  tests	  depend	  on	  
participants’	  assessments	  of	  a	  difference	  in	  strength	  of	  memory	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  two	  
alternatives	  –	  the	  relative	  account.	  In	  the	  present	  study	  we	  focus	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  confidence	  
judgments	  and	  we	  assess	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  against	  the	  absolute	  account	  of	  
confidence,	  by	  which	  in	  assigning	  confidence	  participants	  consider	  only	  strength	  of	  memory	  
evidence	  supporting	  the	  chosen	  alternative.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  study	  show	  that	  confidence	  in	  two-­‐
alternative	  forced-­‐choice	  recognition	  decisions	  is	  higher	  when	  memory	  evidence	  is	  stronger	  for	  the	  
chosen	  alternative	  and	  also	  when	  memory	  evidence	  is	  stronger	  for	  the	  unchosen	  alternative.	  These	  
patterns	  of	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  absolute	  account	  of	  confidence	  in	  two-­‐alternative	  forced-­‐
choice	  recognition	  but	  they	  are	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  relative	  account.	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Confidence	  in	  forced-­‐choice	  recognition:	  What	  underlies	  the	  ratings?	  
In	  the	  recognition	  literature,	  two	  ways	  of	  assessing	  recognition	  performance	  are	  commonly	  
used.	  In	  standard	  single-­‐item	  recognition	  tests,	  decisions	  as	  to	  whether	  single	  items	  were	  studied	  
earlier	  or	  not	  are	  required.	  In	  two-­‐alternative	  forced-­‐choice	  (2AFC)	  recognition	  tests,	  decisions	  
regarding	  which	  of	  two	  presented	  items	  was	  studied	  are	  required.	  For	  both	  types	  of	  tests,	  a	  
recognition	  question	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  a	  question	  concerning	  one’s	  confidence	  in	  the	  
recognition	  decision.	  Confidence	  in	  single-­‐item	  recognition	  has	  been	  widely	  studied	  in	  the	  
recognition	  literature,	  which	  has	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  various	  models	  to	  account	  for	  
differences	  in	  the	  distributions	  of	  confidence	  ratings	  (Wixted,	  2007;	  Yonelinas,	  1994;	  Yonelinas	  &	  
Parks,	  2007).	  However,	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  has	  received	  much	  less	  scrutiny.	  The	  purpose	  
of	  the	  present	  study	  is	  thus	  to	  elucidate	  the	  basis	  of	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  decisions.	  
In	  a	  2AFC	  recognition	  test	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  sources	  of	  memory	  information:	  a	  target	  
and	  a	  lure.	  It	  is	  commonly	  assumed	  that	  performance	  in	  such	  a	  task	  depends	  on	  combining	  evidence	  
from	  these	  two	  sources.	  Specifically,	  models	  of	  recognition	  memory	  assume	  that	  evidence	  for	  the	  
two	  alternatives	  is	  compared	  and	  the	  alternative	  supported	  by	  more	  evidence	  is	  endorsed	  as	  the	  
target	  (e.g.,	  Jang,	  Wixted,	  &	  Huber,	  2009;	  Macmillan	  &	  Creelman,	  2005).	  For	  recognition	  decisions,	  
the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  difference	  is	  unimportant;	  all	  that	  is	  needed	  is	  for	  one	  alternative	  to	  be	  
supported	  by	  more	  evidence	  than	  the	  other	  and	  it	  will	  be	  chosen.	  However,	  the	  same	  need	  not	  be	  
true	  for	  confidence	  in	  the	  recognition	  decision.	  According	  to	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence,	  the	  
larger	  the	  difference	  in	  evidence	  supporting	  one	  alternative	  over	  the	  other,	  the	  stronger	  the	  
confidence	  expressed	  in	  the	  recognition	  endorsement	  of	  this	  alternative	  (e.g.,	  Clark,	  1997).	  	  
One	  strand	  of	  research	  is	  particularly	  informative	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  
confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  decisions.	  A	  number	  of	  studies	  have	  examined	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  
recognition	  decisions	  when	  the	  similarity	  between	  targets	  and	  lures	  is	  manipulated	  (Tulving,	  1981;	  
Dobbins,	  Kroll,	  &	  Liu,	  1998;	  Heathcote,	  Bora,	  &	  Freeman,	  2010;	  Heathcote,	  Freeman,	  Etherington,	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Tonkin,	  &	  Bora,	  2009).	  Tulving	  (1981)	  developed	  a	  paradigm	  in	  which	  participants	  studied	  picture	  
halves	  and	  were	  later	  given	  a	  2AFC	  test	  in	  which	  studied	  halves	  were	  paired	  with	  three	  types	  of	  
lures:	  similar	  lures	  which	  were	  other,	  non-­‐presented	  halves	  of	  the	  target	  picture	  (A	  –	  A’	  pairs),	  
dissimilar	  lures	  which	  were	  non-­‐presented	  halves	  of	  other	  studied	  pictures	  (A	  –	  B’	  pairs),	  and	  novel	  
lures	  which	  were	  halves	  corresponding	  to	  non-­‐studied	  pictures	  (A	  –	  X’	  pairs).	  Comparison	  of	  A	  –	  A’	  
and	  A	  –	  B’	  pairs	  revealed	  a	  cross-­‐over	  dissociation	  of	  accuracy	  and	  confidence;	  that	  is,	  accuracy	  was	  
higher	  for	  A	  –	  A’	  pairs	  but	  confidence	  was	  higher	  for	  A	  –	  B’	  pairs.	  As	  shown	  by	  Clark	  (1997),	  this	  
inversion	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  the	  relative	  account	  if	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  distribution	  of	  
differences	  in	  mean	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  two	  alternatives	  is	  characterized	  by	  lower	  variance	  for	  
A	  –	  A’	  pairs	  than	  for	  A	  –	  B’	  pairs.1	  	  
However,	  important	  insights	  into	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  can	  also	  be	  gleaned	  
from	  a	  comparison	  of	  correct	  responses	  to	  A	  –	  B’	  and	  A	  –	  X’	  pairs.	  For	  these	  pairs,	  the	  target	  strength	  
is	  held	  constant	  and	  only	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  lure	  is	  varied	  by	  the	  virtue	  of	  B’	  being	  similar	  to	  one	  of	  
the	  studied	  items	  and	  X’	  being	  dissimilar	  from	  all	  studied	  items.	  If	  the	  A	  alternative	  is	  correctly	  
endorsed,	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  predicts	  that	  confidence	  should	  be	  higher	  for	  A	  –	  X’	  
pairs	  than	  for	  A	  –	  B’	  pairs.	  Indeed,	  Heathcote	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  observed	  such	  a	  pattern	  in	  a	  study	  in	  
which	  they	  examined	  overall	  confidence	  scores	  in	  a	  recognition	  test	  for	  faces.	  However,	  support	  for	  
the	  relative	  account	  has	  not	  been	  unequivocal.	  	  For	  example,	  Tulving	  (1981)	  and	  Dobbins	  et	  al.	  
(1998)	  presented	  confidence	  results	  separately	  for	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  recognition	  decisions	  and	  
showed	  a	  pattern	  clearly	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  relative	  account	  prediction.	  For	  both	  studies,	  when	  
participants	  chose	  the	  B’	  alternative,	  they	  were	  more	  confident	  than	  when	  they	  chose	  X’	  and	  when	  
participants	  chose	  correctly	  the	  A	  alternative,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  lure	  did	  not	  matter	  at	  all.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  It	  is	  assumed	  here	  that	  the	  means	  of	  two	  distributions	  of	  differences	  in	  evidence	  are	  equal	  but	  the	  variance	  is	  
smaller	  for	  the	  A	  –	  A’	  distribution	  than	  the	  A	  –	  B’	  distribution	  due	  to	  shared	  evidence	  between	  alternatives	  for	  
the	  former	  pairs.	  A	  smaller	  variance	  means	  that	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  differences	  in	  evidence	  are	  
concentrated	  near	  the	  mean,	  which	  favors	  correct	  identifications	  of	  a	  target.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  smaller	  
variance	  means	  also	  that	  a	  smaller	  proportion	  of	  pairs	  lie	  in	  the	  tails	  of	  the	  distributions	  where	  the	  magnitude	  
of	  the	  differences	  is	  largest.	  As	  a	  result,	  confidence	  is	  lower	  for	  the	  A	  –	  A’	  pairs	  even	  if	  accuracy	  is	  greater.	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An	  alternative	  model	  of	  confidence	  in	  recognition	  decisions	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  
literature	  concerned	  with	  metacognitive	  judgments.	  Confidence	  in	  one’s	  recognition	  decisions	  is	  in	  
essence	  a	  metacognitive	  judgment	  concerning	  one’s	  own	  memory	  processes.	  Whereas	  the	  
recognition	  literature	  often	  looks	  at	  how	  the	  same	  information	  (i.e.,	  memory	  evidence)	  shapes	  both	  
accuracy	  and	  confidence,	  as	  in	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition,	  the	  
metacognitive	  perspective	  acknowledges	  that	  metacognitive	  judgments	  may	  be	  shaped	  by	  factors	  
different	  from	  those	  which	  support	  memory	  performance	  (Busey,	  Tunnicliff,	  Loftus,	  &	  Loftus,	  2000;	  
Reinitz,	  Peria,	  Séguin,	  &	  Loftus,	  2011;	  Reinitz,	  Séguin,	  Peria,	  Loftus,	  2012).	  One	  prominent	  strand	  of	  
theorizing	  in	  the	  metacognitive	  literature	  is	  the	  accessibility	  theory	  developed	  by	  Koriat	  (1993,	  1995;	  
see	  also	  Hanczakowski,	  Zawadzka,	  Collie,	  &	  Macken,	  2016).	  In	  the	  accessibility	  theory,	  it	  is	  assumed	  
that	  people’s	  perceptions	  concerning	  what	  they	  know	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  overall	  volume	  of	  memory	  
information	  about	  the	  target	  that	  can	  be	  accessed	  at	  retrieval,	  independently	  of	  whether	  this	  
information	  is	  partial	  or	  complete,	  correct	  or	  incorrect	  or	  even	  whether	  it	  is	  relevant	  or	  irrelevant	  to	  
the	  memory	  question	  that	  is	  being	  asked	  (Brewer,	  Marsh,	  Foos,	  &	  Meeks,	  2010).	  This	  accessibility	  
framework	  suggests	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition.	  According	  to	  the	  
absolute	  account,	  the	  primary	  factor	  behind	  confidence	  in	  the	  2AFC	  task	  would	  be	  information	  
accessed	  for	  a	  chosen	  alternative.	  Such	  an	  account	  seems	  at	  first	  blush	  better	  suited	  for	  describing	  
the	  pattern	  of	  data	  observed	  for	  A	  –	  B’	  and	  A	  –	  X’	  pairs	  in	  the	  paradigm	  developed	  by	  Tulving	  (1981)	  
than	  the	  relative	  account.	  When	  participants	  choose	  the	  target	  (A),	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  
unchosen	  lure	  is	  discounted;	  instead,	  their	  confidence	  should	  primarily	  depend	  on	  memory	  evidence	  
gathered	  for	  this	  target,	  which	  may	  be	  comparable	  for	  both	  types	  of	  pairs.	  When	  participants	  choose	  
a	  lure	  (either	  B’	  or	  X’),	  their	  confidence	  should	  primarily	  depend	  on	  memory	  evidence	  gathered	  for	  
this	  lure,	  which	  on	  average	  should	  be	  stronger	  for	  B’	  lures	  similar	  to	  studied	  items	  than	  for	  X’	  lures	  
that	  are	  not	  similar	  to	  any	  of	  the	  studied	  items.	  
The	  present	  study	  was	  designed	  to	  rigorously	  test	  the	  relative	  and	  absolute	  accounts	  of	  
confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  tests.	  In	  order	  to	  provide	  such	  a	  test,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  look	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independently	  at	  the	  role	  of	  both	  the	  strength	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  and	  the	  
difference	  in	  evidence	  supporting	  both	  alternatives.	  As	  already	  described,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  
alternative	  and	  the	  difference	  in	  strength	  of	  both	  alternatives	  can	  be	  disentangled	  using	  Tulving’s	  
(1981)	  paradigm.	  However,	  the	  paradigm	  is	  limited	  in	  that	  it	  only	  allows	  for	  assessment	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  when	  participants	  endorse	  a	  lure	  (as	  strength	  differs	  between	  
B’	  and	  X’	  lures)	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  strengths	  of	  both	  alternatives	  when	  participants	  
endorse	  a	  target	  (difference	  is	  strength	  is	  then	  larger	  for	  A	  –	  X’	  than	  for	  A	  –	  B’	  pairs).	  It	  is	  unclear	  
whether	  the	  same	  conclusions	  would	  hold	  if	  the	  role	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  was	  
assessed	  for	  targets	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  strengths	  of	  both	  alternatives	  was	  assessed	  
when	  participants	  endorse	  a	  lure.	  Accordingly,	  in	  the	  present	  study	  we	  provided	  a	  new	  test	  of	  the	  
relative	  and	  absolute	  accounts	  of	  confidence	  by	  relying	  on	  two	  different	  methods.	  
First,	  we	  independently	  varied	  evidence	  supporting	  both	  targets	  and	  lures.	  Thus	  we	  created	  
pairs	  in	  which	  both	  targets	  and	  lures	  were	  supported	  by	  weak	  or	  strong	  memory	  evidence	  and	  also	  
pairs	  in	  which	  either	  only	  a	  target	  or	  only	  a	  lure	  was	  supported	  by	  strong	  memory	  evidence.	  This	  
design	  allowed	  us	  to	  look	  both	  at	  confidence	  when	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  is	  varied	  
and	  at	  confidence	  when	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  is	  varied,	  with	  all	  comparisons	  
conducted	  separately	  for	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  choices.	  The	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  
straightforwardly	  predicts	  confidence	  to	  increase	  as	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  gains	  in	  strength	  and/or	  
as	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  decreases	  in	  strength.	  The	  absolute	  account	  of	  confidence	  also	  predicts	  
confidence	  to	  increase	  as	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  gains	  in	  strength,	  but	  its	  predictions	  differ	  
depending	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  alternative.	  When	  unchosen	  alternatives	  are	  weak,	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  can	  range	  from	  relatively	  weak	  (only	  marginally	  stronger	  than	  the	  
rejected	  alternative)	  to	  very	  strong.	  However,	  if	  unchosen	  alternatives	  are	  strong,	  the	  set	  of	  chosen	  
alternatives	  is	  restricted	  to	  the	  strongest	  alternatives.	  Given	  that	  the	  average	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  
alternatives	  should	  thus	  be	  higher	  when	  the	  unchosen	  alternatives	  are	  strong	  rather	  than	  weak,	  the	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absolute	  account	  predicts	  increased	  confidence	  in	  a	  recognition	  choice	  with	  increased	  strength	  of	  
the	  unchosen	  alternative,	  a	  prediction	  that	  is	  directly	  opposite	  to	  that	  of	  the	  relative	  account.2	  	  
Second,	  we	  included	  in	  our	  design	  pairs	  that	  were	  composed	  from	  either	  two	  targets	  or	  two	  
lures.	  The	  strength	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  two	  alternatives	  in	  these	  pairs	  was	  varied	  across	  pairs	  but	  
held	  constant	  within	  pairs.	  Given	  that	  for	  these	  pairs,	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  strength,	  the	  mean	  difference	  in	  
evidence	  between	  the	  two	  alternatives	  should	  be	  zero,	  the	  relative	  account	  predicts	  no	  difference	  in	  
confidence	  between	  strong	  and	  weak	  pairs.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  absolute	  account,	  which	  argues	  for	  the	  
role	  of	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  only,	  makes	  a	  clear	  prediction	  that	  confidence	  should	  be	  
higher	  for	  pairs	  consisting	  of	  two	  equally	  strong	  alternatives	  than	  for	  pairs	  consisting	  of	  two	  equally	  
weak	  alternatives.	  
In	  order	  to	  contrast	  targets	  and	  lures	  supported	  by	  strong	  and	  weak	  memory	  evidence	  we	  
adapted	  the	  plurals	  paradigm	  (Hintzman	  &	  Curran,	  1994)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  present	  study.	  In	  the	  
plurals	  paradigm,	  participants	  study	  various	  concrete	  nouns	  in	  their	  singular	  or	  plural	  form.	  On	  the	  
final	  recognition	  test,	  participants	  are	  presented	  with	  studied	  words	  and	  lures	  which	  are	  words	  for	  
which	  the	  plurality	  form	  has	  been	  changed	  from	  encoding.	  Thus,	  if	  participants	  study	  frog	  and	  
tables,	  later	  they	  might	  be	  given	  the	  test	  pair	  frog	  –	  table	  for	  which	  frog	  is	  the	  target	  and	  table	  is	  the	  
lure.	  The	  plurals	  paradigm	  allows	  the	  strength	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  lure	  to	  be	  manipulated	  by	  
varying	  the	  number	  of	  presentations	  of	  its	  parent	  word.	  Thus,	  multiple	  presentations	  of	  tables	  
should	  increase	  memory	  support	  for	  the	  word	  ‘table’	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  similarity.	  	  
An	  additional	  factor	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  plurals	  paradigm,	  however,	  
which	  is	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  process	  (see	  Rotello,	  Macmillan,	  &	  Van	  Tassel,	  2000,	  for	  evidence	  of	  recall-­‐
to-­‐reject	  in	  the	  plurals	  paradigm;	  see	  also	  Rotello	  &	  Heit,	  1999,	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  failures	  to	  detect	  
the	  influence	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  in	  this	  paradigm).	  Participants	  may	  be	  able	  to	  reject	  a	  lure	  related	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Note	  that	  the	  aforementioned	  patterns	  observed	  by	  Tulving	  (1981)	  and	  Dobbins	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  of	  no	  difference	  
in	  confidence	  as	  a	  function	  of	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  are	  actually	  inconsistent	  with	  both	  
accounts.	  We	  return	  to	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  General	  Discussion.	  	  
CONFIDENCE	  IN	  2AFC	  RECOGNITION	   	  
	  
8	  
a	  strong	  study	  item	  by	  virtue	  of	  recalling	  the	  original	  study	  word	  and	  inferring	  that	  a	  presented	  
alternative	  should	  be	  rejected	  given	  its	  different	  form.	  Successful	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  may	  serve	  to	  
increase	  confidence	  when	  the	  rejected	  lure	  is	  similar	  to	  a	  strong	  study	  item,	  thus	  reducing	  a	  possible	  
impact	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  strength	  that	  is	  predicted	  by	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  (i.e.,	  
under	  conditions	  of	  greater	  similarity,	  this	  account	  would	  predict	  low	  confidence,	  which	  may	  be	  
increased	  if	  participants	  are	  able	  to	  confidently	  reject	  a	  lure	  based	  on	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject).	  However,	  it	  is	  
vital	  to	  note	  that	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  by	  definition	  occurs	  only	  for	  lures,	  and	  not	  for	  targets,	  so	  its	  
influence	  on	  the	  pattern	  of	  confidence	  can	  be	  inferred	  if	  asymmetries	  occur	  between	  various	  
conditions	  depending	  on	  whether	  the	  endorsed	  item	  is	  a	  target	  or	  a	  lure.	  This	  issue	  will	  be	  discussed	  
further	  after	  we	  report	  the	  results	  of	  each	  of	  the	  experiments.	  	  
Experiment	  1	  
The	  present	  experiment	  looked	  at	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  decisions	  in	  a	  paradigm	  
that	  varied	  orthogonally	  the	  strength	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  targets	  and	  lures	  in	  the	  plurals	  
paradigm.	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  alternatives	  (both	  targets	  and	  lures)	  was	  varied	  by	  the	  number	  of	  
presentations	  of	  their	  parent	  words:	  more	  presentations	  of	  parents	  words	  should	  induce	  a	  greater	  
similarity	  of	  the	  recognition	  alternative	  to	  memory	  records,	  thus	  increasing	  the	  strength	  of	  memory	  
evidence	  for	  this	  alternative	  (save	  for	  the	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  process	  for	  lures,	  which	  is	  addressed	  later).	  
The	  final	  recognition	  test	  included	  also	  what	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  null	  trials:	  target-­‐target	  pairs	  for	  
one	  group	  of	  participants	  and	  lure-­‐lure	  pairs	  for	  the	  other	  group.	  For	  null	  trials,	  both	  alternatives	  
were	  on	  average	  of	  equal	  strength,	  either	  high	  or	  low,	  which	  was	  also	  manipulated	  by	  varying	  the	  
number	  of	  presentations	  of	  their	  parent	  words.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  experiment	  was	  on	  
confidence	  when:	  a)	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  varies,	  b)	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  
alternative	  varies,	  and	  c)	  the	  strength	  of	  both	  alternatives	  is	  equal.	  All	  comparisons	  were	  conducted	  
while	  accounting	  for	  the	  correctness	  of	  the	  recognition	  decisions.	  
Method	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Participants.	  Fifty-­‐two	  undergraduate	  students	  of	  Cardiff	  University	  participated	  in	  this	  
experiment	  for	  course	  credit	  or	  monetary	  compensation.	  Twenty-­‐six	  participants	  were	  assigned	  to	  
each	  of	  the	  experimental	  groups.	  
Materials	  and	  design.	  A	  total	  of	  160	  singular	  nouns	  with	  length	  ranging	  from	  four	  to	  eight	  
letters	  were	  chosen	  from	  the	  MRC	  database.	  A	  set	  of	  160	  plural	  nouns	  was	  created	  by	  adding	  the	  
letter	  “-­‐s”	  to	  each	  singular	  noun;	  this	  resulted	  in	  the	  length	  range	  for	  plural	  nouns	  of	  five	  to	  nine	  
letters.	  For	  study,	  a	  list	  of	  140	  words	  was	  used.	  Half	  of	  the	  words	  within	  the	  study	  list	  were	  
presented	  in	  singular	  form	  (e.g.,	  frog),	  while	  the	  other	  half	  were	  presented	  in	  plural	  form	  (e.g.,	  
tables).	  For	  counterbalancing	  purposes,	  two	  versions	  of	  the	  study	  list	  were	  created	  so	  that	  half	  of	  
the	  participants	  saw	  the	  words	  frog	  and	  tables,	  while	  the	  other	  half	  were	  presented	  with	  frogs	  and	  
table.	  In	  addition	  to	  varying	  word	  forms,	  word	  strength	  was	  manipulated	  by	  varying	  the	  number	  of	  
presentations	  at	  study.	  Non-­‐strengthened	  words	  were	  presented	  only	  once,	  while	  strengthened	  
words	  were	  presented	  three	  times.	  	  
At	  test,	  160	  words	  were	  presented,	  80	  in	  singular	  and	  80	  in	  plural	  form.	  Three	  different	  item	  
categories	  were	  used.	  Words	  presented	  in	  the	  same	  form	  at	  study	  and	  at	  test	  (either	  singular-­‐to-­‐
singular	  or	  plural-­‐to-­‐plural)	  served	  as	  targets	  at	  test.	  Half	  of	  the	  targets	  were	  non-­‐strengthened	  
(studied	  once),	  and	  half	  were	  strengthened	  (studied	  three	  times).	  Words	  presented	  in	  different	  form	  
at	  study	  and	  at	  test	  (singular-­‐to-­‐plural	  or	  plural-­‐to-­‐singular)	  served	  as	  lures,	  with	  half	  of	  them	  being	  
non-­‐strengthened	  (i.e.,	  presented	  at	  study	  once	  in	  a	  different	  form)	  and	  half	  being	  strengthened	  
(i.e.,	  presented	  at	  study	  three	  times	  in	  a	  different	  form).	  New	  words,	  not	  presented	  before,	  were	  
also	  included	  in	  the	  lure	  category.	  New	  words	  were	  included	  for	  consistency	  with	  previous	  studies	  
using	  the	  plurals	  paradigm	  (e.g.,	  Rotello	  &	  Heit,	  2000)	  and	  results	  from	  trials	  containing	  such	  new	  
words	  were	  not	  analyzed.	  	  
There	  were	  two	  versions	  of	  the	  test	  list,	  each	  reflecting	  the	  assignment	  of	  words	  to	  singular	  
or	  plural	  form	  at	  study.	  The	  only	  between-­‐participants	  factor	  in	  this	  experiment	  was	  the	  type	  of	  null	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trials	  at	  test,	  with	  one	  group	  being	  presented	  with	  target-­‐target	  trials,	  and	  the	  other	  with	  lure-­‐lure	  
trials.	  Figure	  1	  presents	  the	  assignment	  of	  word	  types	  to	  test	  trials	  in	  both	  experimental	  groups.	  	  
Procedure.	  The	  procedure	  was	  the	  same	  for	  both	  experimental	  groups.	  Before	  the	  study	  
phase	  began,	  participants	  were	  provided	  with	  instructions	  for	  the	  encoding	  task:	  	  
You	  will	  now	  be	  presented	  with	  study	  words.	  Try	  to	  memorize	  as	  many	  words	  
as	  possible.	  	  
Each	  word	  will	  appear	  on	  a	  computer	  screen	  for	  a	  brief	  period	  of	  time.	  Some	  
of	  these	  words	  will	  be	  presented	  more	  than	  once.	  Also,	  some	  of	  the	  words	  
will	  be	  presented	  in	  a	  singular	  form,	  whereas	  other	  words	  will	  be	  presented	  
in	  plural.	  Try	  to	  memorize	  the	  form	  in	  which	  the	  words	  are	  presented.	  To	  
make	  the	  task	  easier,	  you	  may	  pronounce	  each	  word	  quietly	  to	  yourself.	  
Note	  that	  the	  words	  will	  be	  presented	  at	  a	  very	  fast	  rate.	  However,	  please	  try	  
to	  concentrate	  on	  memorizing	  the	  words	  during	  the	  whole	  presentation.	  
At	  study,	  each	  word	  was	  presented	  for	  700	  ms,	  with	  a	  300	  ms	  inter-­‐stimulus	  interval.	  The	  
order	  of	  presentation	  was	  randomized	  anew	  for	  each	  participant.	  After	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  
whole	  study	  list,	  instructions	  for	  the	  retrieval	  task	  were	  displayed:	  
Your	  memory	  for	  the	  words	  presented	  earlier	  will	  now	  be	  tested.	  You	  will	  be	  
presented	  with	  pairs	  of	  words.	  Your	  task	  is	  to	  choose	  ONE	  word	  from	  each	  
pair	  that	  was	  presented	  before.	  Some	  of	  the	  words	  may	  be	  presented	  in	  a	  
different	  form	  than	  the	  one	  in	  which	  they	  appeared	  in	  the	  study	  list.	  Such	  a	  
word	  should	  be	  considered	  an	  INCORRECT	  answer.	  For	  example,	  imagine	  that	  
the	  word	  "BANANA"	  appeared	  on	  the	  study	  list.	  In	  this	  case,	  "BANANA"	  
would	  be	  the	  correct	  answer,	  whereas	  "BANANAS"	  should	  be	  considered	  
incorrect.	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After	  choosing	  the	  word	  that	  was	  presented	  before,	  rate	  your	  confidence	  
that	  your	  answer	  is	  correct.	  Type	  in	  "1"	  if	  you	  are	  guessing	  and	  "6"	  if	  you	  are	  
sure	  that	  this	  is	  the	  correct	  answer.	  Use	  numbers	  2-­‐5	  to	  indicate	  
intermediate	  levels	  of	  confidence.	  
On	  each	  test	  trial,	  test	  words	  were	  aligned	  horizontally.	  Participants	  could	  not	  advance	  to	  
the	  next	  trial	  unless	  an	  answer	  and	  a	  confidence	  rating	  were	  provided.	  
Results	  
	   The	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  present	  experiment	  was	  to	  examine	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  
as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  and	  unchosen	  alternatives.	  Before	  presenting	  the	  
confidence	  data,	  however,	  we	  discuss	  how	  manipulations	  of	  strength	  of	  the	  alternatives	  affected	  
accuracy	  of	  recognition	  decisions.	  	  
	   Accuracy.	  The	  means	  for	  the	  accuracy	  data	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  1.	  The	  null	  trials	  (two	  lures	  
or	  two	  targets)	  are	  not	  discussed	  here	  as,	  by	  definition,	  all	  responses	  on	  these	  trials	  were	  either	  
correct	  (two	  targets)	  or	  incorrect	  (two	  lures),	  but	  given	  that	  the	  type	  of	  null	  trials	  defined	  our	  two	  
experimental	  groups,	  all	  analyses	  are	  performed	  with	  the	  group	  as	  a	  between-­‐participants	  factor.	  A	  
2	  (target	  strength:	  strong	  vs.	  weak)	  x	  2	  (lure	  strength:	  strong	  vs.	  weak)	  x	  2	  (null	  trials	  group:	  two	  
targets	  vs.	  two	  lures)	  mixed	  Analysis	  of	  Variance	  (ANOVA)	  on	  hit	  rates	  yielded	  a	  significant	  main	  
effect	  of	  target	  strength,	  F(1,	  50)	  =	  35.10,	  MSE	  =	  .03,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .41,	  and	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  
of	  lure	  strength,	  F(1,	  50)	  =	  5.05,	  MSE	  =	  .03,	  p	  =	  .029,	  ηp2	  =	  .09.	  No	  other	  effect	  was	  significant,	  largest	  
F(1,	  50)	  =	  3.00,	  p	  =	  .089,	  for	  the	  target	  strength	  x	  group	  interaction.	  These	  results	  indicate	  that,	  
predictably,	  2AFC	  recognition	  performance	  improved	  if	  recognition	  targets	  were	  strong,	  M	  =	  .67,	  SD	  
=	  .14,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  .53,	  SD	  =	  .15,	  and	  if	  recognition	  lures	  were	  weak,	  M	  =	  .63,	  SD	  =	  .15,	  
rather	  than	  strong,	  M	  =	  .57,	  SD	  =	  .15.	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   Confidence.	  The	  means	  for	  the	  confidence	  data	  for	  standard	  pairs	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  1.	  
For	  confidence	  data,	  results	  were	  analyzed	  separately	  for	  trials	  on	  which	  a	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  
alternative	  was	  endorsed.	  For	  correct	  trials	  on	  which	  a	  target	  was	  endorsed,	  a	  2	  (target	  strength)	  x	  2	  
(lure	  strength)	  x	  2	  (group)	  mixed	  ANOVA	  on	  mean	  of	  confidence	  judgments	  yielded	  significant	  main	  
effects	  of	  target	  strength,	  F(1,	  50)	  =	  34.74,	  MSE	  =	  0.56,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .41,	  and	  lure	  strength,	  F(1,	  50)	  
=	  5.26,	  MSE	  =	  0.54,	  p	  =	  .026,	  ηp2	  =	  .10.	  No	  other	  effect	  was	  significant,	  all	  Fs	  <	  1.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  
target	  strength	  shows	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  correct	  recognition	  decisions	  
when	  endorsed	  targets	  were	  strong,	  M	  =	  4.06,	  SD	  =	  0.89,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  3.44,	  SD	  =	  0.86.	  The	  
main	  effect	  of	  lure	  strength	  shows	  that	  participants	  were	  also	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  correct	  
recognition	  decisions	  when	  the	  unchosen	  lures	  were	  strong,	  M	  =	  3.87,	  SD	  =	  0.94,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  
M	  =	  3.63,	  SD	  =	  0.79.	  	  
	   For	  the	  analysis	  of	  incorrect	  trials	  on	  which	  lures	  rather	  than	  targets	  were	  endorsed,	  eight	  
participants	  needed	  to	  be	  excluded	  due	  to	  missing	  cells	  (i.e.,	  perfect	  recognition	  performance	  in	  one	  
of	  the	  conditions).	  A	  2	  (target	  strength)	  x	  2	  (lure	  strength)	  x	  2	  (group)	  mixed	  ANOVA	  on	  mean	  
confidence	  judgments	  from	  the	  remaining	  44	  participants	  yielded	  significant	  main	  effects	  of	  target	  
strength,	  F(1,	  42)	  =	  5.57,	  MSE	  =	  0.64,	  p	  =	  .023,	  ηp2	  =	  .12,	  and	  lure	  strength,	  F(1,	  42)	  =	  22.84,	  MSE	  =	  
0.83,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .35.	  No	  other	  effect	  was	  significant,	  largest	  F(1,	  42)	  =	  1.21,	  p	  =	  .28.	  The	  main	  
effect	  of	  lure	  strength	  shows	  again	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  incorrect	  
recognition	  decisions	  when	  the	  endorsed	  alternatives	  (i.e.,	  lures	  for	  incorrectly	  answered	  trials)	  were	  
strong,	  M	  =	  3.87,	  SD	  =	  0.74,	  versus	  weak,	  M	  =	  3.22,	  SD	  =	  1.00.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  target	  strength	  
shows	  again	  that	  participants	  were	  also	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  incorrect	  recognition	  responses	  
when	  the	  unchosen	  alternatives	  (i.e.,	  targets	  for	  incorrectly	  answered	  trials)	  were	  strong,	  M	  =	  3.69,	  
SD	  =	  0.90,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  3.40,	  SD	  =	  0.81.	  
	   Mean	  confidence	  ratings	  assigned	  to	  null	  pairs	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  2.	  Confidence	  for	  null	  
trials	  was	  analyzed	  with	  a	  2	  (group:	  target-­‐target	  vs.	  lure-­‐lure)	  x	  2	  (strength	  of	  alternatives:	  strong	  vs.	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weak)	  mixed	  ANOVA.	  This	  yielded	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  strength	  of	  alternatives,	  F(1,	  50)	  =	  
51.20,	  MSE	  =	  0.28,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .51	  and	  a	  marginal	  effect	  of	  group,	  F(1,	  50)	  =	  3.75,	  MSE	  =	  1.03,	  p	  =	  
.058,	  ηp2	  =	  .07.	  However,	  both	  effects	  were	  qualified	  by	  a	  significant	  interaction,	  F(1,	  50)	  =	  7.61,	  MSE	  
=	  0.28,	  p	  =	  .008,	  ηp2	  =	  13.	  The	  interaction	  arose	  because	  the	  effect	  of	  strength	  on	  confidence	  was	  
larger	  for	  null	  trials	  consisting	  of	  two	  targets	  rather	  than	  two	  lures,	  although	  it	  was	  reliable	  for	  both	  
comparisons,	  t(25)	  =	  7.32,	  SE	  =	  0.14,	  p	  <	  .001,	  and	  t(25)	  =	  2.99,	  SE	  =	  0.15,	  p	  =	  .006,	  respectively.	  
Discussion	  
	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  present	  experiment	  can	  be	  summarized	  as	  four	  main	  points.	  First,	  the	  
accuracy	  of	  2AFC	  recognition	  decisions	  was	  affected	  in	  a	  predictable	  way	  by	  our	  strength	  
manipulations.	  Participants	  were	  more	  accurate	  when	  targets	  were	  strengthened	  by	  multiple	  
presentations	  at	  study	  but	  they	  were	  also	  less	  accurate	  when	  lures	  closely	  resembled	  words	  that	  
were	  strengthened	  at	  study.	  Second,	  confidence	  in	  recognition	  decisions	  was	  affected	  by	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  so	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  confident	  when	  they	  were	  
endorsing	  the	  alternative	  that	  was	  strong	  rather	  than	  weak.	  This	  effect	  occurred	  for	  both	  chosen	  
targets	  and	  lures.	  Third,	  confidence	  in	  recognition	  decisions	  was	  also	  affected	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  
unchosen	  alternative	  so	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  confident	  when	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  was	  
strong	  rather	  than	  weak.	  Again,	  this	  effect	  occurred	  for	  both	  unchosen	  targets	  and	  lures.	  These	  two	  
strength	  effects,	  one	  for	  the	  chosen	  alternatives	  and	  the	  other	  for	  the	  unchosen	  alternatives,	  were	  
independent.	  Fourth,	  confidence	  in	  decisions	  made	  for	  null	  trials	  consisting	  of	  two	  targets	  or	  two	  
lures	  was	  also	  affected	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  alternatives,	  with	  greater	  confidence	  when	  both	  
alternatives	  were	  strong	  rather	  than	  weak.	  This	  last	  effect	  was	  stronger	  for	  pairs	  composed	  of	  two	  
targets	  but	  was	  present	  also	  for	  pairs	  composed	  of	  two	  lures.	  
We	  outlined	  earlier	  two	  hypotheses	  of	  how	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  may	  depend	  on	  strength	  of	  
the	  two	  alternatives:	  the	  relative	  account	  and	  the	  absolute	  account.	  The	  relative	  account	  fails	  to	  
provide	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  our	  findings.	  This	  account	  stipulates	  that	  in	  assigning	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confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  decisions,	  participants	  weigh	  two	  alternatives	  and	  give	  higher	  
confidence	  judgments	  when	  the	  difference	  in	  evidence	  supporting	  each	  alternative	  is	  larger.	  The	  
relative	  account	  predicts	  confidence	  to	  be	  higher	  for	  stronger	  chosen	  alternatives,	  as	  observed	  in	  
our	  data,	  but	  it	  also	  clearly	  predicts	  confidence	  to	  be	  higher	  when	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  is	  
weaker.	  The	  fact	  that	  confidence	  increased	  with	  increasing	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  is	  
not	  predicted	  by	  the	  relative	  account	  in	  its	  simplest	  formulation.	  Also,	  the	  pure	  version	  of	  the	  
relative	  account	  predicts	  no	  strength	  effect	  for	  the	  null	  trials	  in	  which	  strength	  of	  support	  for	  all	  
alternatives	  should,	  on	  average,	  be	  equal	  and	  thus	  confidence	  should	  be	  generally	  low.	  In	  the	  
present	  study,	  not	  only	  was	  confidence	  for	  target	  –	  target	  null	  trials	  clearly	  high	  in	  general,	  but	  an	  
effect	  of	  strength	  was	  clearly	  detected	  for	  both	  types	  of	  null	  trials.	  
The	  results,	  by	  contrast,	  are	  fully	  consistent	  with	  the	  absolute	  account	  by	  which	  the	  strength	  
of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  is	  fundamental	  for	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  confidence	  judgment.	  This	  
account	  also	  clearly	  predicts	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  that	  was	  observed	  
in	  the	  present	  experiment	  for	  both	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  recognition	  trials.	  It	  also	  provides	  a	  
straightforward	  account	  for	  the	  results	  of	  null	  trials,	  for	  which	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  
is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  manipulated	  strength	  of	  the	  overall	  pair.	  	  
Most	  importantly,	  the	  absolute	  account	  predicts	  the	  counterintuitive	  finding	  of	  increased	  
confidence	  with	  increased	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  alternative.	  Consider	  first	  the	  correct	  trials	  for	  
which	  targets	  are	  endorsed.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  weak	  lures,	  many	  targets	  will	  have	  enough	  strength	  
to	  exceed	  that	  of	  those	  lures,	  even	  if	  that	  evidence	  is	  relatively	  weak.	  However,	  when	  lures	  become	  
strong	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  similarity	  to	  repeated	  parent	  words,	  only	  a	  few	  targets	  supported	  by	  
relatively	  strong	  memory	  evidence	  will	  be	  correctly	  endorsed.	  Because	  confidence	  according	  to	  the	  
absolute	  account	  is	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  item,	  this	  mean	  that	  strong	  lures	  will	  
increase	  confidence	  in	  chosen	  targets	  compared	  to	  weak	  lures.	  The	  same	  logic	  applies	  to	  incorrect	  
trials	  in	  which	  the	  average	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  lure	  should	  be	  higher	  when	  these	  lures	  are	  chosen	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in	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  rather	  than	  weak	  targets.	  Indeed,	  this	  finding	  was	  also	  observed	  in	  
Experiment	  1.	  
As	  signalled	  earlier,	  one	  issue	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  discussed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  present	  findings	  is	  
the	  problem	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject.	  Some	  studies	  have	  documented	  the	  process	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  
operating	  in	  the	  plurals	  paradigm	  (Rotello	  &	  Heit,	  2000),	  although	  other	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  its	  
role	  may	  be	  small	  unless	  explicitly	  encouraged	  by	  the	  instructions	  (Rotello	  &	  Heit,	  1999).	  Needless	  to	  
say,	  our	  instructions	  were	  mute	  on	  this	  issue	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  but	  we	  still	  cannot	  exclude	  the	  
possibility	  that	  participants	  used	  this	  strategy	  in	  the	  present	  task.	  What	  consequences	  would	  this	  
have	  for	  our	  results?	  Recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  should	  be	  more	  successful	  if	  the	  parent	  word	  is	  strengthened	  
by	  multiple	  presentations.	  The	  consequences	  for	  performance	  of	  this	  strengthening	  are	  unclear	  
because	  stronger	  parent	  words	  should	  simultaneously	  increase	  the	  strength	  of	  lures,	  facilitating	  
incorrect	  responding,	  and	  increase	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject,	  reducing	  incorrect	  responding.	  Several	  studies	  
used	  an	  old/new	  associative	  recognition	  task	  in	  which	  pairs	  of	  two	  re-­‐paired	  words	  were	  tested	  that	  
were	  characterized	  by	  increased	  familiarity	  and	  increased	  effectiveness	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  due	  to	  
multiple	  presentations	  of	  the	  original	  pairs	  containing	  re-­‐paired	  words.	  The	  balance	  of	  these	  two	  
effects	  commonly	  led	  to	  the	  manipulation	  of	  strength	  having	  no	  effect	  on	  performance	  (Buchler,	  
Faunce,	  Light,	  Gottfredson,	  &	  Reder,	  2011;	  Kelley	  &	  Wixted,	  2001),	  although	  an	  increase	  in	  incorrect	  
responding	  has	  also	  been	  observed	  (Malmberg	  &	  Xu,	  2007).	  It	  thus	  remains	  possible	  that	  increased	  
strength	  of	  lures	  whose	  parent	  words	  were	  repeated	  masked	  the	  increased	  effectiveness	  of	  recall-­‐
to-­‐reject	  in	  our	  data,	  still	  leading	  to	  the	  observed	  pattern	  of	  better	  recognition	  performance	  for	  
weaker	  lures.	  
Given	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  participants	  using	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  strategy	  in	  our	  study,	  we	  
need	  to	  consider	  the	  consequences	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  could	  have	  for	  the	  confidence	  patterns.	  If	  
strengthening	  parent	  words	  increases	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject,	  then	  this	  could	  translate	  
into	  increased	  confidence	  despite	  similarity	  of	  these	  lures	  to	  a	  strongly	  encoded	  parent	  word.	  This	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additional	  confidence	  gained	  from	  effective	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  could	  account	  for	  the	  pattern	  of	  higher	  
confidence	  when	  the	  unchosen	  lure	  is	  strong	  as	  well	  as	  the	  pattern	  of	  increased	  confidence	  for	  
strong	  rather	  than	  weak	  lure-­‐lure	  pairs	  –	  two	  patterns	  that	  are	  not	  handled	  by	  the	  relative	  account	  
of	  confidence	  in	  its	  basic	  form	  but	  that	  are	  predicted	  by	  the	  absolute	  account.	  However,	  it	  needs	  to	  
be	  stressed	  that	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  is	  a	  monitoring	  strategy	  that	  operates	  on	  lures	  and	  should	  not	  affect	  
the	  processing	  of	  targets.	  Thus,	  the	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  augmentation	  of	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  
confidence	  can	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  pattern	  of	  confidence	  when	  lures	  are	  rejected	  –	  either	  in	  
standard	  or	  null	  pairs	  –	  but	  it	  does	  not	  change	  the	  predictions	  of	  this	  account	  when	  targets	  are	  
rejected	  –	  either	  in	  standard	  or	  null	  pairs.	  A	  vital	  thing	  to	  note,	  however,	  is	  that	  patterns	  observed	  in	  
our	  study	  were	  the	  same	  whether	  considered	  for	  unchosen	  lures	  or	  for	  unchosen	  targets.	  Thus,	  the	  
relative	  account	  with	  the	  additional	  component	  of	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  cannot	  handle	  the	  pattern	  of	  
increased	  confidence	  on	  incorrect	  trials	  when	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  target	  is	  varied	  and	  
neither	  can	  it	  handle	  the	  pattern	  observed	  for	  null	  target-­‐target	  pairs.	  Thus,	  although	  the	  recall-­‐to-­‐
reject	  account,	  mostly	  due	  to	  its	  flexibility	  inherent	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  two	  opposing	  effects	  producing	  an	  
unpredictable	  balance,	  could	  possibly	  explain	  some	  of	  our	  results,	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  an	  
overarching	  account	  of	  the	  data.	  
Experiment	  2	  
	  Experiment	  2	  was	  conducted	  to	  extend	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1	  to	  a	  different	  type	  of	  
confidence	  judgment.	  We	  used	  exactly	  the	  same	  design	  and	  materials,	  varying	  independently	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  targets	  and	  lures	  in	  the	  plurals	  paradigm	  and	  including	  two	  groups	  that	  were	  tested	  
with	  null	  trials	  composed	  of	  two	  targets	  or	  two	  lures.	  The	  only	  thing	  that	  was	  changed	  in	  the	  present	  
study	  was	  the	  format	  of	  responding	  in	  a	  2AFC	  recognition	  test.	  Experiment	  1	  asked	  participants	  to	  
first	  endorse	  the	  target	  and	  then	  rate	  confidence	  in	  their	  decision.	  This	  is	  a	  metacognitive	  confidence	  
scale	  by	  which	  participants	  rate	  the	  correctness	  of	  their	  responses.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  at	  least	  some	  
results	  observed	  in	  Experiment	  1	  were	  due	  to	  this	  metacognitive	  nature	  of	  the	  scale	  that	  puts	  a	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chosen	  alternative	  in	  the	  focus	  of	  attention	  required	  to	  make	  a	  metacognitive	  judgment.	  It	  is	  of	  
interest	  whether	  the	  same	  patterns	  would	  be	  observed	  with	  a	  scale	  that	  deemphasizes	  the	  
metacognitive	  focus	  on	  the	  decision	  concerning	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  and	  instead	  requires	  greater	  
consideration	  of	  differences	  between	  two	  alternatives.	  In	  Experiment	  2	  we	  thus	  asked	  participants	  
to	  respond	  by	  using	  a	  one-­‐step	  confidence	  scale	  by	  which	  they	  judged	  how	  likely	  it	  was	  that	  an	  item	  
presented	  on	  the	  left/right	  was	  studied.	  
Method	  
Participants.	  Fifty-­‐two	  undergraduate	  students	  of	  Cardiff	  University	  participated	  in	  this	  
experiment	  for	  course	  credit	  or	  monetary	  compensation,	  with	  26	  assigned	  to	  each	  of	  the	  two	  
experimental	  groups.	  Results	  of	  one	  person	  from	  the	  lure-­‐lure	  group	  were	  lost	  due	  to	  an	  
experimenter’s	  error.	  
Materials	  and	  procedure.	  Experiment	  2	  utilized	  the	  same	  materials	  as	  Experiment	  1.	  The	  
procedure	  was	  also	  the	  same	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1,	  with	  only	  one	  exception:	  instead	  of	  a	  two-­‐step	  
procedure,	  with	  participants	  first	  choosing	  one	  word	  and	  indicating	  confidence	  that	  this	  choice	  was	  
accurate,	  a	  one-­‐step	  procedure	  was	  implemented.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  the	  studied	  word	  
was	  made	  using	  the	  confidence	  scale.	  The	  final	  part	  of	  test	  instructions	  was	  adapted	  to	  convey	  this	  
change:	  
To	  indicate	  your	  answer,	  use	  the	  confidence	  scale.	  Type	  in	  "1"	  if	  you	  are	  sure	  
that	  the	  word	  on	  the	  left	  is	  the	  correct	  answer	  and	  type	  in	  "6"	  if	  you	  are	  sure	  
that	  the	  word	  on	  the	  right	  is	  the	  correct	  answer.	  Use	  numbers	  2-­‐5	  to	  indicate	  
intermediate	  levels	  of	  confidence.	  
Results	  
	   Accuracy.	  The	  accuracy	  scores	  for	  the	  present	  experiment	  were	  derived	  from	  participants’	  
confidence	  judgments.	  Thus,	  confidence	  judgments	  1-­‐3	  were	  re-­‐coded	  as	  endorsements	  of	  the	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alternative	  presented	  on	  the	  left	  and	  confidence	  judgments	  4-­‐6	  were	  re-­‐coded	  as	  endorsements	  of	  
the	  alternative	  presented	  on	  the	  right.	  The	  means	  of	  the	  derived	  accuracy	  scores	  are	  presented	  in	  
Table	  1.	  A	  2	  (target	  strength)	  x	  2	  (lure	  strength)	  x	  2	  (group)	  mixed	  ANOVA	  on	  the	  derived	  hit	  rate	  for	  
standard	  pairs	  yielded	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  target	  strength,	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  16.07,	  MSE	  =	  .04,	  p	  <	  
.001,	  ηp2	  =	  .25.	  This	  effect	  confirms	  that,	  predictably,	  recognition	  performance	  was	  better	  for	  strong	  
targets,	  M	  =	  .67,	  SD	  =	  .16,	  versus	  weak	  targets,	  M	  =	  .56,	  SD	  =	  .13.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  results	  of	  
Experiment	  1,	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  lure	  strength	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  3.06,	  MSE	  =	  .03,	  p	  =	  
.086,	  ηp2	  =	  .06,	  although	  the	  numerical	  trend	  was	  in	  the	  same	  direction	  as	  the	  effect	  observed	  in	  
Experiment	  1,	  with	  better	  performance	  for	  trials	  with	  weak	  lures,	  M	  =	  .64,	  SD	  =	  .11,	  versus	  strong	  
lures,	  M	  =	  .60,	  SD	  =	  .15.	  No	  other	  effect	  was	  significant,	  largest	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  1.39,	  p	  =	  .24.	  
	   Confidence.	  The	  confidence	  data	  were	  also	  re-­‐coded	  in	  order	  to	  analyze	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  and	  unchosen	  alternatives	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  Ratings	  1	  and	  
6	  were	  re-­‐coded	  as	  reflecting	  highest	  confidence	  (value	  of	  3)	  for	  the	  ‘chosen’	  alternative,	  ratings	  2	  
and	  5	  were	  re-­‐coded	  as	  reflecting	  moderate	  level	  of	  confidence	  (value	  of	  2)	  and	  ratings	  3	  and	  4	  were	  
re-­‐coded	  as	  reflecting	  lowest	  confidence	  (value	  of	  1).	  These	  derived	  means	  for	  the	  confidence	  data	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  1.	  They	  were	  again	  analyzed	  separately	  for	  trials	  in	  which	  a	  correct	  and	  
incorrect	  alternative	  were	  chosen.	  For	  correct	  trials	  on	  which	  targets	  were	  chosen,	  a	  2	  (target	  
strength)	  x	  2	  (lure	  strength)	  x	  2	  (group)	  mixed	  ANOVA	  yielded	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  target	  
strength,	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  60.74,	  MSE	  =	  0.11,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .55,	  and	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  lure	  
strength,	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  8.64,	  MSE	  =	  0.14,	  p	  =	  .005,	  ηp2	  =	  .15.	  No	  other	  effect	  was	  significant,	  largest	  F(1,	  
49)	  =	  3.14,	  p	  =	  .083,	  for	  the	  target	  strength	  x	  lure	  strength	  interaction.	  These	  results	  replicate	  the	  
results	  of	  Experiment	  1.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  target	  strength	  shows	  that	  participants	  were	  more	  
confident	  in	  their	  correct	  recognition	  decisions	  when	  endorsed	  targets	  were	  strong,	  M	  =	  2.37,	  SD	  =	  
0.33,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  2.02,	  SD	  =	  0.37.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  lure	  strength	  shows	  that	  participants	  
were	  also	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  correct	  recognition	  decisions	  when	  the	  unchosen	  lures	  were	  
strong,	  M	  =	  2.27,	  SD	  =	  0.37,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  2.12,	  SD	  =	  0.36.	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   For	  the	  analysis	  of	  incorrect	  trials	  on	  which	  lures	  rather	  than	  targets	  were	  chosen	  five	  
participants	  needed	  to	  be	  excluded	  due	  to	  missing	  cells	  (i.e.,	  perfect	  recognition	  performance	  in	  one	  
of	  the	  conditions).	  A	  2	  (target	  strength)	  x	  2	  (lure	  strength)	  x	  2	  (group)	  mixed	  ANOVA	  on	  the	  means	  of	  
derived	  confidence	  judgments	  from	  the	  remaining	  46	  participants	  yielded	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  
lure	  strength,	  F(1,	  44)	  =	  5.28,	  MSE	  =	  0.18,	  p	  =	  .026,	  ηp2	  =	  .11,	  again	  showing	  that	  confidence	  was	  
higher	  when	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  was	  strong,	  M	  =	  2.01,	  SD	  =	  0.44,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  1.87,	  SD	  
=	  0.45.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  target	  strength	  was	  marginal,	  F(1,	  44)	  =	  3.76,	  MSE	  =	  0.13,	  p	  =	  .059,	  ηp2	  =	  
.08,	  but	  a	  clear	  numerical	  trend	  suggested	  higher	  confidence	  when	  the	  unchosen	  target	  was	  strong,	  
M	  =	  2.00,	  SD	  =	  0.44,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  1.89,	  SD	  =	  0.42,	  consistent	  with	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  
1.	  No	  other	  effect	  was	  significant,	  largest	  F(1,	  44)	  =	  2.67,	  p	  =	  .11.	  
	   The	  derived	  confidence	  means	  for	  null	  pairs	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  2.	  Derived	  confidence	  
judgments	  for	  null	  trials	  were	  analyzed	  with	  a	  2	  (group:	  target-­‐target	  vs.	  lure-­‐lure)	  x	  2	  (strength	  of	  
alternatives:	  strong	  vs.	  weak)	  mixed	  ANOVA.	  This	  yielded	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  strength	  of	  
alternatives,	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  18.82,	  MSE	  =	  0.08,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp2	  =	  .28.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  group	  was	  not	  
significant,	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  3.95,	  MSE	  =	  0.20,	  p	  =	  .053,	  ηp2	  =	  .07,	  and	  neither	  was	  the	  interaction,	  F	  <	  1.	  The	  
numerical	  trend	  that	  was	  present	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  type	  of	  trials	  suggested	  slightly	  higher	  
confidence	  for	  target-­‐target	  pairs,	  M	  =	  2.16,	  SD	  =	  0.28,	  than	  for	  lure-­‐lure	  pairs,	  M	  =	  1.98,	  SD	  =	  0.35.	  
These	  results	  differ	  from	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1	  inasmuch	  as	  a	  significant	  interaction	  that	  was	  
obtained	  there	  pointed	  to	  a	  larger	  effect	  of	  strength	  for	  two-­‐target	  pairs	  compared	  to	  two-­‐lure	  pairs.	  
The	  main	  observation	  remains,	  however,	  that	  a	  clear	  effect	  of	  strength	  was	  observed,	  with	  higher	  
confidence	  for	  strong	  pairs,	  M	  =	  2.20,	  SD	  =	  0.25,	  than	  for	  weak	  pairs,	  M	  =	  1.96,	  SD	  =	  0.30,	  for	  trials	  
for	  which	  an	  average	  difference	  in	  strength	  for	  two	  alternatives	  should	  be	  null.	  
Discussion	  
	   The	  results	  of	  Experiment	  2	  largely	  replicate	  the	  results	  of	  Experiment	  1.	  Two	  effects	  that	  
were	  significant	  in	  Experiment	  1	  –	  the	  effect	  of	  lure	  strength	  on	  accuracy	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  target	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strength	  on	  confidence	  when	  the	  lure	  was	  endorsed	  –	  were	  not	  significant	  here,	  although	  clear	  
trends	  were	  observed	  that	  were	  consistent	  with	  these	  previous	  results.	  One	  effect	  that	  was	  not	  
replicated	  here	  was	  an	  interaction	  of	  strength	  and	  type	  of	  the	  null	  trial.	  It	  is	  unclear	  why	  this	  effect	  
was	  not	  present	  here;	  in	  any	  case,	  this	  remains	  of	  secondary	  importance	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  
present	  study.	  
	   The	  fact	  that	  patterns	  of	  data	  observed	  in	  Experiment	  1	  were	  generally	  replicated	  indicates	  
that	  variations	  in	  the	  format	  of	  responding	  do	  not	  fundamentally	  change	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  
confidence	  judgments	  are	  made,	  at	  least	  under	  present	  conditions.	  We	  speculated	  that	  a	  
metacognitive	  framework	  of	  confidence	  by	  which	  participants	  are	  asked	  to	  focus	  on	  their	  responses	  
rather	  than	  the	  status	  of	  the	  tested	  items	  could	  have	  reduced	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  relative	  strategy	  
of	  assigning	  confidence	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  This	  hypothesis	  is	  refuted	  by	  the	  current	  results	  which	  again	  
revealed	  patterns	  that	  are	  not	  predicted	  by	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition.	  
Of	  particular	  interest	  is	  again	  the	  counterintuitive	  finding	  that	  confidence	  was	  greater	  when	  the	  
unchosen	  alternative	  was	  strong	  rather	  than	  weak.	  Again,	  the	  absolute	  account,	  but	  not	  the	  relative	  
account,	  is	  well-­‐posed	  to	  explain	  this	  finding	  as	  well	  as	  the	  overall	  pattern	  of	  results.	  
	   The	  relative	  account	  of	  confidence	  neither	  predicts	  nor	  explains	  the	  patterns	  observed	  here.	  
However,	  this	  account	  could	  gain	  additional	  flexibility	  if	  another	  factor	  was	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  
As	  described	  earlier	  (see	  footnote	  1),	  patterns	  of	  accuracy-­‐confidence	  dissociations	  can	  be	  handled	  
by	  this	  account	  if	  variances	  of	  the	  distributions	  of	  differences	  in	  evidence	  strength	  are	  considered.	  
This	  raises	  a	  question	  of	  whether	  our	  manipulation	  of	  strength	  might	  have	  led	  to	  changes	  in	  variance	  
of	  memory	  evidence	  associated	  with	  targets	  and	  lures	  and	  consequently	  to	  changes	  in	  differences	  in	  
evidence	  supporting	  two	  alternatives.	  Any	  such	  difference	  in	  variances	  could	  have	  consequences	  for	  
interpreting	  our	  results.	  The	  null	  trials	  could	  serve	  as	  an	  example	  of	  such	  interpretative	  
consequences.	  If	  strengthening	  by	  repetition	  increases	  variances	  of	  target	  and	  lure	  distributions	  
positioned	  on	  the	  dimension	  of	  memory	  evidence,	  then	  it	  also	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  variance	  of	  a	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distribution	  of	  pairs	  positioned	  on	  the	  dimension	  of	  within-­‐pair	  differences	  in	  this	  evidence.	  As	  
argued	  for	  the	  case	  of	  choice	  similarity	  effects	  described	  by	  Tulving	  (1981),	  under	  the	  relative	  
account	  greater	  variance	  of	  this	  distribution	  translates	  into	  higher	  average	  confidence	  (Clark,	  1997).	  
This	  is	  because	  more	  pairs	  are	  then	  characterized	  by	  a	  large	  difference	  in	  evidence,	  which,	  according	  
to	  the	  relative	  account,	  should	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  high	  confidence	  ratings.	  One	  could	  thus	  argue	  that	  
the	  effect	  of	  strength	  on	  null	  trials	  reflected	  this	  increased	  variance	  rather	  than	  a	  simple	  strategy	  of	  
basing	  confidence	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  without	  considering	  the	  difference	  in	  
strength	  between	  alternatives,	  as	  supposed	  by	  the	  absolute	  account.	  	  
The	  question	  of	  changes	  in	  variance	  in	  memory	  evidence	  due	  to	  repetition	  is	  an	  empirical	  
one.	  Previous	  investigations	  into	  this	  issue	  suggested	  that	  the	  repetition	  manipulation	  is	  not	  
associated	  with	  any	  changes	  in	  variance	  of	  memory	  evidence	  (e.g.,	  Ratcliff,	  Sheu,	  &	  Gronlund,	  1992;	  
Starns,	  2014;	  Starns	  &	  Ratcliff,	  2014).	  However,	  these	  previous	  studies	  used	  standard	  materials	  
employed	  in	  recognition	  studies	  –	  unrelated	  words	  –	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  these	  effects	  are	  
different	  in	  the	  plurals	  task.	  For	  this	  reason,	  in	  Experiment	  3	  we	  addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  
repetition	  manipulation	  affects	  variances	  of	  memory	  evidence	  for	  both	  targets	  and	  lures	  in	  the	  
plurals	  paradigm.	  
Experiment	  3	  
	   In	  the	  present	  experiment	  we	  assessed	  how	  the	  repetition	  of	  parent	  words	  affects	  variance	  
of	  memory	  evidence	  associated	  with	  targets	  and	  lures	  in	  the	  plurals	  paradigm.	  To	  remain	  consistent	  
with	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  we	  used	  exactly	  the	  same	  materials	  and	  design,	  again	  manipulating	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  tested	  items	  and	  including	  null	  pairs.	  Variances	  for	  different	  item	  types	  –	  in	  our	  case,	  
strong	  and	  weak	  items	  –	  can	  be	  compared	  by	  plotting	  z-­‐receiver	  operating	  characteristic	  (z-­‐ROC)	  
curves	  that	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  confidence	  judgments	  (a	  proxy	  for	  a	  bias	  manipulation)	  in	  old/new	  
recognition.	  The	  slope	  of	  the	  z-­‐ROC	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  ratio	  of	  variances	  for	  the	  item	  distributions,	  
so	  that,	  assuming	  underlying	  Gaussian	  distributions,	  a	  slope	  of	  1	  reveals	  that	  the	  variances	  are	  equal,	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and	  deviations	  from	  this	  value	  suggest	  unequal	  variances.	  Thus,	  in	  Experiment	  3	  we	  changed	  the	  
format	  of	  responding,	  this	  time	  asking	  participants	  to	  rate	  confidence	  that	  the	  item	  is	  new	  or	  old	  on	  
a	  1-­‐6	  scale,	  separately	  for	  each	  word	  in	  the	  pair.	  Hence,	  we	  effectively	  changed	  our	  procedure	  to	  
old/new	  recognition,	  while	  preserving	  the	  display	  format	  of	  pairs	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  consistency	  
across	  experiments.	  	  
	   Despite	  the	  similarity	  of	  our	  procedure	  to	  standard	  old/new	  recognition,	  our	  z-­‐ROC	  analysis	  
was	  somewhat	  unconventional.	  Specifically,	  rather	  than	  using	  confidence	  to	  plot	  the	  z-­‐scores	  for	  hit	  
rates	  versus	  false	  alarm	  rates	  to	  determine	  the	  ratio	  of	  variances	  for	  target	  and	  lure	  distributions,	  we	  
plotted	  z-­‐scores	  for	  the	  endorsement	  rates	  of	  strong	  versus	  weak	  targets	  on	  one	  z-­‐ROC,	  and	  z-­‐scores	  
for	  the	  endorsement	  rates	  of	  strong	  versus	  weak	  lures	  on	  the	  other.	  We	  did	  this	  to	  investigate	  how	  
strength	  affected	  the	  target	  variance	  and	  the	  lure	  variance	  in	  the	  2AFC	  task	  used	  in	  Experiments	  1	  
and	  2.	  Target-­‐target	  and	  lure-­‐lure	  z-­‐ROCs	  allow	  us	  to	  assess	  separately	  the	  role	  of	  strength	  on	  
targets	  and	  lures,	  respectively.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  allows	  us	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  
distribution	  of	  evidence	  differences	  in	  2AFC	  was	  affected	  by	  strength,	  which	  is	  important	  in	  
evaluating	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  relative	  account.	  	  
Method	  
Participants.	  68	  Cardiff	  University	  students	  participated	  in	  this	  experiment	  for	  course	  credit	  
or	  monetary	  compensation,	  with	  34	  participants	  assigned	  to	  each	  of	  the	  experimental	  groups,	  
defined	  again	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  either	  target-­‐target	  or	  lure-­‐lure	  pairs.	  
Materials	  and	  procedure.	  The	  materials	  were	  the	  same	  as	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2.	  The	  
procedure	  was	  also	  the	  same	  as	  in	  previous	  experiments,	  save	  for	  the	  format	  of	  responding	  at	  test.	  
Participants	  were	  instructed	  ‘to	  decide	  for	  EACH	  word	  whether	  it	  was	  presented	  before,	  using	  a	  
scale	  from	  1	  to	  6,	  where	  1	  means	  "certain	  new"	  and	  6	  means	  "certain	  old"’.	  They	  were	  also	  explicitly	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informed	  that	  two	  old	  or	  two	  new	  words	  could	  be	  presented	  at	  the	  same	  trial,	  and	  that	  in	  such	  a	  
case	  they	  should	  give	  both	  of	  these	  words	  high	  (or	  low)	  ratings.	  
Results	  
Figure	  2	  shows	  z-­‐ROCs	  constructed	  from	  data	  pooled	  across	  participants	  for	  targets	  (panel	  A)	  
and	  lures	  (panel	  B).	  The	  slopes	  calculated	  from	  group	  data	  using	  Principal	  Component	  Analysis	  
(Vokey,	  2016)	  equalled	  0.967	  for	  targets,	  and	  0.794	  for	  lures.	  We	  further	  calculated	  two	  z-­‐ROC	  
slopes	  for	  each	  participant	  –	  one	  for	  targets,	  and	  one	  for	  lures.	  When	  averaged	  across	  participants,	  
the	  slope	  for	  targets	  equalled	  0.959	  (SD	  =	  0.37).	  A	  Bayesian	  t-­‐test	  conducted	  using	  the	  JASP	  software	  
(JASP	  Team,	  2016)	  showed	  that	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  mean	  being	  not	  different	  from	  1	  was	  5.05	  
times	  more	  likely	  than	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis,	  consistent	  with	  variances	  for	  strengthened	  and	  
non-­‐strengthened	  targets	  being	  comparable.	  The	  slope	  for	  lures	  equalled	  0.806	  (SD	  =	  0.31),	  which	  
was	  9,152	  times	  as	  likely	  under	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  null.	  This	  analysis	  
confirmed	  that	  strengthened	  lures	  had	  a	  greater	  variance	  than	  non-­‐strengthened	  lures.	  
Discussion	  
	   In	  the	  present	  experiment	  we	  assessed	  how	  the	  repetition	  manipulation	  of	  parent	  words	  
affects	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  memory	  evidence	  associated	  with	  targets	  and	  lures	  in	  the	  
plurals	  paradigm.	  Replicating	  previous	  research	  that	  looked	  at	  a	  similar	  issue	  in	  a	  standard	  
recognition	  test	  (e.g.,	  Starns,	  2014;	  Starns	  &	  Ratcliff,	  2014),	  we	  found	  the	  repetition	  manipulation	  to	  
have	  little	  effect	  on	  variance	  for	  targets.	  Going	  beyond	  these	  results,	  we	  also	  found	  that	  repetitions	  
of	  parent	  words	  affected	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  memory	  evidence	  for	  lures	  derived	  from	  
these	  parent	  words.	  The	  variance	  of	  memory	  evidence	  for	  strong	  lures	  was	  larger	  when	  the	  parent	  
word	  was	  repeated	  rather	  than	  presented	  only	  once.	  
	   The	  main	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  variance	  effects	  of	  repetitions	  revealed	  in	  the	  present	  
study	  can	  account	  for	  the	  patterns	  of	  confidence	  described	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2.	  We	  argue	  that	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they	  cannot.	  The	  effects	  of	  repetition	  were	  observed	  for	  lures	  which	  could	  potentially	  affect	  
confidence	  patterns	  in	  all	  cases	  in	  which	  comparisons	  are	  conducted	  across	  different	  levels	  of	  lure	  
strength:	  the	  effects	  of	  lure	  strength	  on	  confidence	  for	  the	  lure-­‐lure	  null	  trials,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  
unchosen	  alternative	  when	  the	  target	  is	  chosen	  on	  standard	  trials,	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  
the	  chosen	  lure	  itself	  on	  standard	  trials.	  In	  these	  cases,	  greater	  variance	  for	  stronger	  lures	  may	  
translate	  into	  greater	  variance	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  differences	  in	  evidence	  and	  thus	  greater	  
confidence.	  The	  reason	  why	  this	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  full	  pattern	  of	  results	  is	  again	  the	  fact	  that	  
all	  results	  documented	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2	  were	  largely	  independent	  of	  whether	  they	  were	  
considered	  specifically	  for	  lures	  or	  targets.	  No	  effect	  of	  repetition	  was	  observed	  on	  the	  variance	  of	  
evidence	  for	  targets.	  Thus,	  comparisons	  that	  examined	  how	  the	  target	  strength	  affected	  confidence	  
–	  specifically	  null-­‐trial	  comparisons	  involving	  target	  –	  target	  pairs	  and	  standard-­‐trial	  comparisons	  if	  
the	  lure	  was	  chosen	  –	  were	  unaffected	  by	  any	  changes	  in	  variance.3	  
General	  Discussion	  
	   The	  present	  study	  examined	  the	  basis	  of	  confidence	  judgments	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  tests.	  
We	  employed	  the	  plurals	  paradigm,	  which	  allowed	  us	  to	  manipulate	  the	  strength	  of	  targets	  and	  
lures	  by	  varying	  the	  number	  of	  presentations	  of	  their	  parent	  words.	  We	  then	  assessed	  the	  influence	  
of	  strength	  of	  both	  chosen	  and	  unchosen	  alternatives	  on	  confidence	  in	  standard	  pairs	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
role	  of	  strength	  in	  confidence	  for	  null	  trials	  composed	  of	  either	  two	  lures	  or	  two	  targets.	  The	  most	  
important	  results,	  documented	  in	  Experiments	  1	  and	  2,	  indicated	  that	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  
recognition	  was	  dependent	  both	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  
unchosen	  alternative	  but	  not	  on	  the	  difference	  in	  strength	  between	  these	  alternatives.	  First,	  we	  
found	  that	  the	  stronger	  the	  chosen	  alternative,	  the	  higher	  the	  confidence.	  This	  relationship	  held	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  was	  a	  lure	  or	  a	  target.	  Second,	  for	  standard	  target-­‐lure	  
pairs,	  confidence	  was	  higher	  when	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  was	  strong	  rather	  than	  weak	  and	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Note	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  target	  did	  not	  interact	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  strength	  of	  the	  
chosen	  lure.	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difference	  also	  occurred	  independently	  of	  whether	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  was	  a	  target	  or	  a	  lure.	  
Third,	  for	  null	  trials	  consisting	  of	  two	  targets	  or	  two	  lures,	  confidence	  was	  higher	  for	  two	  strong	  
rather	  than	  two	  weak	  alternatives.	  
	   The	  results	  summarized	  here	  were	  used	  to	  test	  two	  competing	  accounts	  of	  confidence	  in	  
2AFC	  recognition	  test.	  According	  to	  the	  relative	  account,	  confidence	  depends	  on	  the	  difference	  in	  
strength	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  two	  alternatives	  on	  each	  recognition	  trial.	  Several	  findings	  argue	  
against	  this	  account.	  First,	  the	  relative	  account	  predicts	  that	  for	  null	  trials	  –	  trials	  consisting	  of	  two	  
items	  of	  the	  same	  average	  strength	  and	  thus	  preserving	  the	  average	  difference	  in	  evidence	  at	  zero	  –	  
the	  strength	  of	  individual	  alternatives	  should	  not	  matter	  for	  confidence.	  The	  relative	  account	  thus	  
fails	  to	  explain	  why	  confidence	  was	  consistently	  higher	  for	  pairs	  composed	  of	  two	  strong	  targets	  
rather	  than	  two	  weak	  targets	  and	  also	  for	  pairs	  composed	  of	  two	  strong	  lures	  rather	  than	  two	  weak	  
lures.	  Second,	  the	  relative	  account	  predicts	  that	  increasing	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  
should	  reduce	  confidence.	  In	  a	  stark	  contrast	  to	  this	  prediction,	  the	  results	  revealed	  greater	  
confidence	  whenever	  recognition	  endorsements	  were	  made	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  rather	  than	  
weak	  alternatives.	  	  
	   Although	  the	  relative	  account	  did	  not	  fare	  well	  in	  its	  purest	  form,	  we	  also	  discussed	  two	  
mechanisms	  by	  which	  the	  relative	  account	  could	  be	  modified	  to	  explain	  these	  results.	  First,	  
confidence	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  strong	  unchosen	  alternative	  might	  have	  increased	  because	  of	  a	  
recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  mechanism.	  Given	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  experimental	  task,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  recall-­‐to-­‐
reject	  strategy	  was	  employed	  on	  some	  of	  the	  test	  trials.	  This	  mechanism	  would	  also	  be	  consistent	  
with	  the	  difference	  in	  variances	  of	  strong	  and	  weak	  lure	  distributions	  (see	  Experiment	  3):	  recall-­‐to-­‐
reject	  should	  be	  more	  likely	  for	  strengthened	  than	  for	  non-­‐strengthened	  lures,	  decreasing	  the	  
evidence	  for	  some	  of	  these	  lures	  and	  thus	  increasing	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  whole	  distribution.	  
However,	  the	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  mechanism	  cannot	  fully	  account	  for	  the	  pattern	  of	  results	  found	  in	  our	  
data.	  Recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  can	  operate	  only	  for	  lures	  and	  thus	  it	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  confidence	  in	  the	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presence	  of	  a	  stronger	  unchosen	  alternative	  was	  increased	  both	  when	  this	  unchosen	  alternative	  was	  
a	  lure	  and	  when	  it	  was	  a	  target.	  Similarly,	  this	  mechanism	  cannot	  account	  for	  the	  pattern	  observed	  
for	  target-­‐target	  pairs	  for	  which	  there	  should	  be	  no	  recall-­‐to-­‐reject.	  Second,	  confidence	  might	  have	  
been	  affected	  by	  increased	  variance	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  strong	  compared	  to	  weak	  alternatives.	  
In	  Experiment	  3	  we	  directly	  assessed	  whether	  repetitions	  of	  parent	  words	  affect	  variances	  of	  
evidence	  supporting	  targets	  and	  lures.	  Although	  the	  results	  of	  this	  experiment	  revealed	  increased	  
variance	  of	  evidence	  for	  lures	  corresponding	  to	  repeated	  parent	  words,	  no	  such	  increase	  was	  
observed	  for	  targets.	  In	  effect,	  the	  variance	  argument	  suffers	  from	  the	  same	  shortcoming	  as	  the	  
recall-­‐to-­‐reject	  argument	  which	  is	  its	  failure	  to	  account	  for	  the	  symmetry	  of	  the	  results	  across	  the	  
lure/target	  status.	  
	   The	  second	  hypothesis	  under	  consideration	  was	  the	  absolute	  account	  by	  which	  confidence	  
in	  2AFC	  recognition	  depends	  primarily	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  just	  the	  chosen	  alternative.	  This	  hypothesis	  
provides	  a	  good	  account	  of	  our	  results.	  It	  is	  straightforwardly	  consistent	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  
confidence	  depends	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  for	  both	  standard	  and	  null	  pairs.	  More	  
interestingly,	  it	  also	  predicts	  the	  counterintuitive	  finding	  that	  confidence	  is	  increased	  in	  the	  presence	  
of	  a	  strong	  unchosen	  alternative.	  This	  happens	  because	  the	  presence	  of	  strong	  unchosen	  
alternatives	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative:	  Alternatives	  that	  are	  chosen	  
from	  pairs	  with	  strong	  unchosen	  alternatives	  are	  necessarily	  stronger	  on	  average	  than	  alternatives	  
that	  are	  chosen	  from	  pairs	  with	  weak	  unchosen	  alternatives.	  This	  filtering	  out	  of	  weaker	  alternatives	  
by	  strong	  unchosen	  alternatives	  translates	  into	  higher	  confidence.	  
The	  fact	  that	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  seems	  at	  least	  sometimes	  to	  depend	  on	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  a	  
confidence-­‐accuracy	  relationship.	  There	  are	  various	  ways	  of	  asking	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  
confidence	  tracks	  accuracy	  (see	  Roediger,	  Wixted,	  &	  DeSoto,	  2012,	  for	  a	  detailed	  discussion).	  One	  
can	  be	  interested	  whether	  people	  are	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  more	  accurate	  responses	  or	  whether	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people	  who	  express	  greater	  confidence	  in	  their	  responses	  are	  actually	  more	  accurate.	  However,	  
from	  the	  perspective	  of	  studies	  into	  basic	  memory	  processes,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  interesting	  question	  
is	  whether	  conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  more	  accurate	  responding	  lead	  also	  to	  higher	  confidence	  being	  
expressed	  for	  these	  responses.	  Roediger	  et	  al.	  have	  recently	  summarized	  research	  on	  this	  topic	  by	  
arguing	  that	  “the	  exceptions	  are	  sufficiently	  few	  that	  we	  can	  safely	  conclude	  that	  when	  an	  
independent	  variable	  affects	  accuracy	  of	  memory	  reports,	  subjects’	  confidence	  in	  those	  reports	  will	  
virtually	  always	  be	  affected	  the	  same	  way	  (however,	  see	  Tulving,	  1981,	  for	  a	  somewhat	  different	  
case)”	  (p.	  98).	  However,	  as	  noted	  by	  Busey	  et	  al.	  (2000),	  confidence	  is	  likely	  to	  track	  differences	  in	  
performance	  only	  if	  confidence	  is	  shaped	  by	  exactly	  the	  same	  factors	  as	  those	  that	  determine	  the	  
accuracy	  of	  memory	  responses.	  The	  accuracy	  of	  responses	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  test	  depends	  on	  the	  
difference	  in	  evidence	  supporting	  two	  alternatives.	  The	  larger	  this	  difference	  is,	  the	  more	  accurate	  
participants’	  responses	  can	  potentially	  be.	  If	  confidence	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  this	  difference,	  but	  
instead	  depends	  only	  on	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  response,	  then	  this	  creates	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  
confidence-­‐accuracy	  dissociations.	  Indeed,	  our	  results	  point	  to	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  increasing	  the	  
strength	  of	  the	  lure	  reduces	  the	  accuracy	  of	  recognition	  decisions	  (a	  significant	  effect	  in	  Experiment	  
1	  and	  a	  marginal	  effect,	  p	  =	  .086,	  in	  Experiment	  2),	  yet	  it	  increases	  confidence	  in	  these	  decisions.4	  
	   The	  current	  results	  provide	  a	  particularly	  striking	  example	  of	  confidence-­‐accuracy	  
dissociation	  where	  lower	  accuracy	  is	  accompanied	  by	  higher	  confidence.	  We	  argue	  that	  this	  happens	  
because	  confidence	  is	  based	  on	  different	  factors	  than	  those	  that	  determine	  recognition	  accuracy	  (cf.	  
Busey	  et	  al.,	  2000).	  To	  be	  sure,	  both	  confidence	  and	  accuracy	  can	  depend	  on	  the	  same	  type	  of	  
memory	  information	  that	  we	  refer	  to	  simply	  as	  strength,	  without	  postulating	  the	  necessity	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Across	  experiments	  we	  analyzed	  confidence	  in	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  responses	  separately.	  The	  negative	  
relationship	  between	  accuracy	  and	  confidence	  across	  experimental	  manipulations	  is	  thus	  evident	  when	  
accuracy	  is	  contrasted	  with	  confidence	  in	  correct	  responses.	  We	  also	  reanalyzed	  confidence	  results	  collapsing	  
across	  correct	  and	  incorrect	  recognition	  decisions.	  This	  collapsed	  analysis	  bolsters	  our	  conclusions	  based	  on	  
confidence	  in	  correct	  responses	  as	  in	  both	  Experiment	  1	  and	  2	  overall	  confidence	  was	  reliably	  higher	  when	  
lures	  were	  stronger	  [Experiment	  1:	  F(1,	  50)	  =	  28.62,	  MSE	  =	  0.24,	  p	  <	  .001,	  ηp
2	  =	  .40,	  for	  the	  main	  effect	  of	  lure	  
strength	  on	  overall	  confidence,	  with	  higher	  confidence	  when	  lures	  were	  strong,	  M	  =	  3.86,	  SD	  =	  0.74,	  rather	  
than	  weak,	  M	  =	  3.50,	  SD	  =	  0.69;	  Experiment	  2:	  F(1,	  49)	  =	  13.33,	  MSE	  =	  0.08,	  p	  =	  .001,	  ηp
2	  =	  .21,	  with	  higher	  
confidence	  when	  lures	  were	  strong,	  M	  =	  2.20,	  SD	  =	  2.06,	  rather	  than	  weak,	  M	  =	  2.06,	  SD	  =	  .032].	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considering	  unique	  contributions	  of	  familiarity	  and	  recollection	  (see	  Dobbins	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Heathcote	  
et	  al.,	  2010;	  Migo,	  Montaldi,	  Norman,	  Quamme,	  &	  Mayes,	  2009;	  for	  arguments	  that	  this	  distinction	  
is	  necessary	  to	  account	  for	  other	  findings	  obtained	  with	  2AFC	  recognition	  tests).	  However,	  the	  
important	  point	  is	  that	  this	  memory	  information	  contributes	  differentially	  to	  accuracy	  and	  
confidence.	  Whereas	  accuracy	  is	  necessarily	  dependent	  on	  a	  difference	  in	  strength	  of	  two	  
alternatives	  which	  sets	  the	  upper	  boundary	  on	  how	  accurate	  recognition	  decisions	  can	  be,	  
confidence	  can	  utilize	  the	  strength	  information	  in	  a	  different	  way	  due	  to	  strategic	  factors	  that	  are	  
inherent	  in	  all	  metacognitive	  judgments.	  As	  repeatedly	  argued	  by	  Koriat	  (e.g.,	  1993,	  1997),	  all	  
metacognitive	  judgments	  are	  inferential	  and	  thus	  they	  are	  not	  a	  straightforward	  function	  of	  factors	  
determining	  accuracy.	  Participants	  in	  our	  study	  considered	  only	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  chosen	  
alternative	  when	  forming	  their	  confidence	  judgments,	  discounting	  all	  memory	  information	  
associated	  with	  the	  unchosen	  alternative,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  counterintuitive	  negative	  confidence-­‐
accuracy	  relationship.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  previous	  demonstrations	  of	  confidence-­‐accuracy	  dissociations	  have	  shown	  
how	  a	  factor	  that	  does	  not	  contribute	  to	  memory	  performance	  is	  factored	  in	  when	  making	  
confidence	  judgments.	  For	  example,	  the	  work	  conducted	  by	  our	  research	  group	  (Hanczakowski,	  
Pasek,	  Zawadzka,	  &	  Mazzoni,	  2013;	  Hanczakowski,	  Zawadzka,	  &	  Coote,	  2014;	  Hanczakowski,	  
Zawadzka,	  &	  Macken,	  2015)	  demonstrated	  that	  confidence	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  familiarity	  of	  
contextual	  elements	  that	  accompany	  recognition	  trials	  even	  when	  this	  familiarity	  is	  spurious	  and	  
does	  not	  enhance	  recognition	  performance.	  But	  our	  recent	  line	  of	  investigation	  into	  how	  recognition	  
memory	  is	  shaped	  by	  social	  cues	  demonstrates	  clearly	  that	  factors	  affecting	  performance	  may	  be	  
discounted	  when	  making	  confidence	  judgments.	  Krogulska,	  Zawadzka,	  and	  Hanczakowski	  (2016)	  
showed	  that	  in	  a	  memory	  conformity	  paradigm	  in	  which	  by	  and	  large	  accurate	  social	  cues	  are	  
provided	  (see	  Jaeger,	  Lauris,	  Selmeczy,	  &	  Dobbins,	  2012),	  participants	  incorporate	  these	  cues	  into	  
their	  recognition	  decisions,	  enhancing	  their	  recognition	  performance,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  incorporate	  
these	  cues	  into	  their	  confidence	  judgments,	  which	  results	  in	  another	  confidence-­‐accuracy	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dissociation,	  one	  in	  which	  confidence	  does	  not	  track	  changes	  in	  accuracy	  (see	  Zawadzka,	  Krogulska,	  
Button,	  Higham,	  &	  Hanczakowski,	  2016,	  for	  related	  findings).	  This	  last	  dissociation	  arises	  because	  
recognition	  accuracy	  in	  a	  social	  context	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  memory	  but	  also	  on	  accurate	  cues	  
provided	  by	  external	  sources.	  But	  even	  when	  one	  considers	  solely	  memory	  processes,	  performance	  
in	  a	  recognition	  task	  may	  depend	  on	  various	  components	  of	  the	  recognition	  process,	  such	  as	  
recollection	  and	  familiarity,	  to	  which	  confidence	  may	  also	  be	  differentially	  sensitive,	  resulting	  in	  
dissociations	  (see	  Reinitz	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Indeed,	  in	  a	  recent	  study	  by	  Beaman,	  Hanczakowski,	  and	  
Jones	  (2014),	  in	  which	  two	  types	  of	  recognition	  test	  were	  employed	  –	  one	  in	  which	  accuracy	  was	  
mainly	  a	  function	  of	  familiarity	  of	  individual	  items	  and	  one	  in	  which	  accuracy	  was	  shaped	  by	  retrieval	  
of	  specific	  associations	  –	  another	  pattern	  of	  negative	  confidence-­‐accuracy	  relationship	  was	  
observed.	  Together,	  all	  these	  studies	  demonstrate	  that	  positive	  confidence-­‐accuracy	  relationship	  
across	  various	  experimental	  conditions	  may	  be	  a	  less	  prevalent	  pattern	  than	  it	  is	  commonly	  
considered.	  
	   Our	  results	  can	  also	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  light	  of	  a	  discussion	  about	  the	  basis	  of	  recognition	  
decisions	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  task.	  Researchers	  sometimes	  use	  2AFC	  tasks	  as	  they	  are	  thought	  to	  
provide	  a	  measure	  of	  memory	  ability	  uncontaminated	  by	  changes	  in	  bias.	  For	  example,	  in	  studies	  of	  
the	  revelation	  effect,	  the	  increased	  propensity	  to	  endorse	  probes	  presented	  after	  performing	  a	  
simple	  operation	  on	  them	  (e.g.,	  Peynircioğlu	  &	  Tekcan,	  1993;	  Westerman	  &	  Greene,	  1996),	  it	  has	  
been	  argued	  that	  the	  use	  of	  2AFC	  recognition	  task	  reveals	  a	  memory	  impairment	  caused	  by	  the	  
revelation	  manipulation	  that	  is	  masked	  by	  a	  change	  in	  bias	  when	  simple	  recognition	  tasks	  are	  used	  
(Hicks	  &	  Marsh,	  1998).	  The	  argument	  for	  the	  superiority	  of	  2AFC	  recognition	  is	  that,	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  
tasks,	  participants	  weigh	  two	  alternatives	  and	  simply	  choose	  one	  that	  is	  supported	  by	  more	  evidence	  
–	  a	  relative	  strategy	  for	  arriving	  at	  recognition	  decisions.	  However,	  recently	  Starns,	  Staub,	  and	  Chen	  
(2015;	  see	  also	  Jou,	  Flores,	  Cortes,	  &	  Leka,	  2016,	  for	  related	  findings)	  proposed	  that	  absolute	  
strategy	  can	  also	  play	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  2AFC	  tasks.	  Using	  the	  eye-­‐tracking	  methodology,	  Starns	  et	  
al.	  have	  shown	  that	  participants	  faced	  with	  a	  2AFC	  task	  often	  fixate	  on	  only	  one	  of	  the	  alternatives	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before	  arriving	  at	  a	  recognition	  decision,	  which	  suggests	  a	  use	  of	  an	  absolute	  strategy	  for	  arriving	  at	  
recognition	  decisions.	  The	  use	  of	  an	  absolute	  strategy	  implies	  that	  performance	  in	  2AFC	  tasks	  may	  
not	  be	  a	  bias-­‐free	  measure	  of	  underlying	  memory	  processes.	  Our	  results	  have	  no	  straightforward	  
bearing	  on	  this	  debate	  because	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  participants	  rely	  heavily	  on	  the	  relative	  strategy	  for	  
arriving	  at	  a	  recognition	  decision	  and	  then	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  chosen	  alternative	  in	  what	  is	  in	  
effect	  an	  absolute	  strategy	  of	  arriving	  at	  a	  confidence	  assessment.	  However,	  it	  seems	  at	  least	  
plausible	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  we	  found	  strong	  evidence	  for	  the	  absolute	  strategy	  for	  confidence	  
patterns	  is	  that	  our	  participants	  did	  rely	  on	  the	  absolute	  strategy	  throughout	  the	  task,	  often	  not	  
taking	  the	  unchosen	  alternative	  into	  account	  before	  endorsing	  an	  alternative	  they	  considered	  first	  
and	  providing	  their	  confidence	  judgment.	  
	   The	  investigations	  of	  performance	  and	  confidence	  in	  2AFC	  recognition	  judgments	  gained	  
most	  prominence	  in	  the	  paradigm	  investigating	  the	  role	  of	  choice	  similarity	  developed	  by	  Tulving	  
(1981).	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  analysis	  of	  results	  obtained	  in	  this	  paradigm	  concentrate	  on	  how	  
manipulating	  the	  similarity	  of	  lures	  to	  the	  particular	  target	  tested	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  increases	  accuracy	  
while	  reducing	  confidence.	  However,	  data	  reported	  both	  by	  Tulving	  and	  Dobbins	  et	  al.	  (1998)	  
indicate	  that	  similarity	  of	  lures	  to	  the	  overall	  set	  of	  the	  tested	  items	  also	  produces	  an	  unexpected	  
finding	  by	  which	  correct	  decisions	  made	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  weak	  and	  strong	  lures	  are	  made	  at	  the	  
same	  level	  of	  confidence.	  These	  results	  do	  not	  seem	  consistent	  with	  either	  the	  relative	  or	  the	  
absolute	  strategy	  of	  assigning	  confidence.	  We	  suggest	  thus	  that	  they	  can	  reflect	  a	  mix	  of	  these	  two	  
strategies.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  when	  multiple	  alternatives	  are	  presented	  for	  a	  recognition	  task,	  
people	  may	  choose	  the	  most	  adequate	  strategy	  based	  on	  factors	  like	  overall	  level	  of	  memory,	  
perceptual	  features	  of	  the	  tested	  materials,	  number	  of	  alternatives	  (see	  Charman,	  Wells,	  &	  Joy,	  
2011;	  Hanczakowski,	  Zawadzka,	  &	  Higham,	  2014)	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  all	  those	  factors.	  	  The	  
investigations	  into	  choice	  similarity	  commonly	  used	  perceptually	  rich	  materials	  in	  the	  form	  of	  halves	  
of	  pictures.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  with	  much	  perceptual	  detail	  available	  for	  presented	  alternatives	  
participants	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  engage	  in	  relational	  analysis	  in	  support	  of	  both	  recognition	  
CONFIDENCE	  IN	  2AFC	  RECOGNITION	   	  
	  
31	  
decisions	  and	  confidence	  assessments.	  Indeed,	  a	  recent	  similar	  line	  of	  investigation	  into	  confidence	  
judgments	  for	  line-­‐up	  decisions	  (Horry	  &	  Brewer,	  2015)	  provided	  support	  for	  the	  relative	  account	  of	  
confidence	  that	  has	  been	  absent	  from	  our	  results	  documented	  here.	  The	  line-­‐up	  situation	  requires	  
judgments	  concerning	  faces,	  another	  example	  of	  perceptually	  rich	  materials.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  a	  
study	  by	  Heathcote	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  that	  utilized	  the	  choice	  similarity	  paradigm	  of	  Tulving	  (1981)	  with	  
faces	  as	  study	  materials,	  documented	  a	  pattern	  of	  higher	  overall	  confidence	  for	  A-­‐X’	  than	  A-­‐B’	  pairs,	  
which	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  our	  results	  as	  well	  as	  results	  of	  Tulving	  and	  Dobbins	  et	  al.	  (1998).	  
The	  overview	  presented	  here	  points	  to	  a	  type	  of	  materials	  used	  in	  a	  given	  experiment	  as	  a	  
likely	  moderator	  of	  strategies	  used	  to	  arrive	  at	  confidence	  judgments.	  This	  suggestion	  underscores	  
the	  limitation	  of	  our	  study	  that	  used	  only	  one	  specific	  set	  of	  materials.	  Clearly,	  additional	  studies	  are	  
necessary	  for	  elucidating	  the	  basis	  of	  confidence	  judgments	  across	  variations	  in	  to-­‐be-­‐remembered	  
stimuli.	  A	  particularly	  important	  direction	  should	  be	  to	  thoroughly	  investigate	  confidence	  judgments	  
for	  2AFC	  decisions	  in	  studies	  using	  standard	  words	  as	  targets	  and	  lures.	  Studies	  that	  used	  such	  
standard	  materials	  in	  2AFC	  tests	  have	  employed	  confidence	  judgments	  to	  assess	  the	  validity	  of	  
various	  models	  of	  recognition	  memory	  (see	  Jang,	  Wixted,	  &	  Huber,	  2009;	  Smith	  &	  Duncan,	  2004)	  
and	  thus	  the	  investigation	  of	  how	  such	  confidence	  judgments	  are	  arrived	  at	  may	  have	  important	  
consequences	  for	  this	  particular	  method	  of	  model	  validation.	  Related	  to	  this	  point,	  a	  recent	  study	  by	  
Jou	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  looked	  at	  recognition	  decisions	  in	  2AFC	  tests	  utilizing	  standard	  word	  materials.	  Their	  
Experiment	  1B	  included	  null	  trials	  along	  with	  old-­‐new	  pairs	  and	  asked	  participants	  to	  make	  
confidence	  judgments.	  One	  interesting	  finding	  from	  this	  experiment	  was	  that	  participants	  were	  
more	  confident	  in	  their	  decisions	  for	  old-­‐old	  pairs	  than	  they	  were	  for	  their	  recognition	  decisions	  for	  
old-­‐new	  pairs.	  As	  noted	  by	  the	  authors	  (p.	  36):	  “If	  the	  relative	  familiarity	  were	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  
confidence	  rating,	  the	  difference	  in	  familiarity	  between	  the	  two	  items	  in	  the	  normal	  pairs	  is	  much	  
greater	  than	  this	  difference	  in	  the	  both-­‐old	  pairs,	  and	  therefore	  the	  former	  should	  be	  given	  a	  higher	  
confidence	  rating	  than	  the	  latter,	  which,	  however,	  was	  not	  the	  case”.	  This	  analysis	  led	  Jou	  et	  al.	  to	  
conclude	  that	  confidence	  could	  have	  been	  based	  on	  the	  absolute	  familiarity	  of	  a	  chosen	  item,	  which	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remains	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  present	  investigation.5	  Given	  the	  difference	  in	  
materials	  across	  these	  studies,	  the	  results	  of	  Jou	  et	  al.	  suggest	  certain	  generalizability	  of	  our	  findings.	  
Still,	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  variable	  the	  use	  of	  relative	  and	  absolute	  strategies	  in	  2AFC	  tasks	  is	  under	  
changing	  circumstances	  awaits	  further	  empirical	  scrutiny.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  We	  have	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  details	  of	  the	  study	  by	  Jou	  et	  al.	  (2016)	  when	  revising	  the	  present	  paper.	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Table	  1.	  	  
Mean	  Recognition	  Accuracy	  and	  Mean	  Confidence	  for	  Correct	  and	  Incorrect	  Recognition	  
Decisions	  as	  a	  Function	  of	  the	  Strength	  of	  the	  Target	  Alternative	  (T1	  Versus	  T3),	  Strength	  
of	  the	  Lure	  Alternative	  (L1	  Versus	  L3)	  and	  Group	  (Target-­‐Target	  Versus	  Lure-­‐Lure)	  in	  
Experiments	  1	  and	  2.	  Standard	  Errors	  of	  Means	  are	  Given	  in	  Parentheses.	  	  	  	   T1-­‐L1	   T1-­‐L3	   T3-­‐L1	   T3-­‐L3	  Experiment	  1	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Target-­‐target	  group	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  Accuracy	   .55	  (.04)	   .56	  (.04)	   .70	  (.03)	   .61	  (.05)	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  correct	   3.36	  (0.23)	   3.60	  (0.20)	   4.02	  (0.17)	   4.15	  (0.24)	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  incorrect	   3.08	  (0.24)	   3.71	  (0.20)	   3.24	  (0.21)	   3.87	  (0.22)	  	  	  Lure-­‐lure	  group	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Accuracy	   .56	  (.04)	   .45	  (.04)	   .71	  (.04)	   .67	  (.03)	  	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  correct	   3.27	  (0.19)	   3.54	  (0.18)	   3.88	  (0.20)	   4.17	  (0.21)	  	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  incorrect	   3.12	  (0.21)	   3.56	  (0.14)	   3.33	  (0.20)	   4.20	  (0.22)	  Experiment	  2	   	   	   	   	  	  	  Target-­‐target	  group	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Accuracy	   .61	  (.03)	   .52	  (.04)	   .67	  (.03)	   .66	  (.04)	  	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  correct	   1.88	  (0.08)	   2.04	  (0.11)	   2.23	  (0.09)	   2.51	  (0.07)	  	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  incorrect	   1.98	  (0.12)	   1.85	  (0.08)	   1.88	  (0.10)	   2.16	  (0.12)	  	  	  Lure-­‐lure	  group	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Accuracy	   .57	  (.03)	   .56	  (.04)	   .70	  (.03)	   .66	  (.04)	  	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  correct	   2.08	  (0.09)	   2.07	  (0.07)	   2.28	  (0.09)	   2.48	  (0.07)	  	  	  	  	  	  Confidence	  in	  incorrect	   1.83	  (0.10)	   2.03	  (0.10)	   1.86	  (0.12)	   2.11	  (0.11)	  
Note:	  T1	  =	  target	  presented	  once	  at	  study;	  T3	  =	  target	  presented	  thrice	  at	  study;	  L1	  =	  lure’s	  parent	  word	  presented	  once	  at	  study;	  L3	  =	  lure’s	  parent	  word	  presented	  thrice	  at	  study.	  	  




Table	  2.	  	  
Means	  of	  Confidence	  Judgments	  for	  Responses	  to	  Null	  Pairs	  Consisting	  Either	  of	  Two	  Targets	  (Target-­‐Target	  Group)	  or	  Two	  Lures	  (Lure-­‐Lure	  Group)	  
Presented	  as	  a	  Function	  of	  Strength	  of	  Both	  Alternatives.	  Standard	  Errors	  of	  Means	  are	  Given	  in	  Parentheses.	  
	  
	   T1-­‐T1	   T3-­‐T3	   L1-­‐L1	   L3-­‐L3	  
Experiment	  1	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  Target-­‐target	  group	   3.33	  (0.18)	   4.36	  (0.16)	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	  	  Lure-­‐lure	  group	   -­‐	   -­‐	   3.23	  (0.14)	   3.69	  (0.14)	  
Experiment	  2	   	   	   	   	  
	  	  Target-­‐target	  group	   2.02	  (0.07)	   2.30	  (0.07)	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
	  	  Lure-­‐lure	  group	   -­‐	   -­‐	   1.88	  (0.09)	   2.08	  (0.08)	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   Word	  1	   count	   Word	  2	   	  
	   t1	   10	   t1	   	  
	   t3	   10	   t3	   	  
	   t1	   10	   l1	   	  
	   t1	   10	   l3	   	  
	   t1	   10	   n	   	  
	   t3	   10	   l1	   	  
	   t3	   10	   l3	   	  
	   t3	   10	   n	   	  
	   l1	   10	   l1	   	  
	   l3	   10	   l3	   	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  	  Trial	  types	  used	  in	  Experiments	  1-­‐3.	  “T”	  denotes	  targets,	  “l”	  denotes	  lures	  derived	  from	  studied	  parent	  words,	  and	  “n”	  denotes	  new	  lures.	  “1”	  and	  
“3”	  refer	  to	  the	  number	  of	  presentations	  of	  the	  parent	  words	  at	  study.	  
	  



















































Figure	  2.	  z-­‐ROCs	  constructed	  from	  confidence	  ratings	  for	  non-­‐strengthened	  (T1)	  and	  strengthened	  targets	  (T3),	  and	  non-­‐strengthened	  (L1)	  and	  
strengthened	  lures	  (L3).	  	  
